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UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN COSTS OF OFFSHORING:
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This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of implementation that
are neglected in strategic decision-making processes—in the context of services offshoring.
Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision makers are more
likely to make cost-estimation errors given increasing configuration and task complexity in
captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that experience
and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy reduce the
cost-estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to research on the
effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of organizational
design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity. Copyright  2012 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Many firms find that the implementation of strate-
gic decisions can trigger substantial hidden costs
that negatively affect firm performance. For exam-
ple, a firm may find that the implementation of a
diversification strategy requires substantially more
coordination than initially expected. A firm may
also discover that knowledge transfer in the con-
text of internationalizing business activities is more
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costly than expected. By hidden costs, we refer
to the unanticipated costs of implementation that
arise in strategic decision-making processes (see
Dibbern, Winkler, and Heinzl, 2008; Reitzig and
Wagner, 2010; Stringfellow, Teagarden, and Nie,
2008). In this paper, we investigate the nature of
estimation errors due to hidden costs. In particu-
lar, we seek to better understand why certain costs
are hidden from managerial attention and thus not
accounted for in initial cost estimations.
We study hidden costs in the context of off-
shoring of administrative and technical services,
that is, the sourcing of business services support-
ing domestic and global operations from abroad
in internal or external arrangements (Contrac-
tor et al., 2010; Manning, Massini, and Lewin,
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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2008). The offshoring of service activities has
gained momentum in recent years. Today, many
western firms not only offshore standardized IT
and business processes but also more complex,
knowledge-intensive activities and product devel-
opment (Lewin, Massini, and Peeters, 2009). How-
ever, many firms have begun to realize that manag-
ing an increasingly globally dispersed organization
is more difficult and costly than initially expected
(Dibbern et al., 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In
particular, decision makers often fail to accurately
estimate the costs of offshoring and are there-
fore surprised by unexpected—or hidden—costs
of implementing offshoring decisions.
Most research on offshoring to date has focused
on why firms offshore particular functions, the
governance modes they choose, the locations they
select to host offshored activities, and the outcomes
that they achieve (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Kedia
and Mukherjee, 2009; Mol, van Tulder, and Beije,
2005). In this paper, we focus on the organizational
design of offshoring, and the challenge of coordi-
nating and integrating offshoring activities in glob-
ally organized firms (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011).
In this regard, offshoring can be described as an
organizational reconfiguration in which originally
co-located activities are relocated across distances
in captive or outsourced arrangements, which must
subsequently be reintegrated (Mudambi and Ven-
zin, 2010). Consequently, firms are often presented
with new complexities and uncertainties, which
have an impact on decision makers’ abilities to
estimate the costs of offshoring.
Using comprehensive data from the Offshoring
Research Network, we argue that the increased
complexity that follows from offshoring involves a
number of operational challenges and related costs,
part of which are ignored or not anticipated when
offshoring decisions are made. As a result, we
observe a significant gap between expected and
achieved performance, as measured by the dis-
tance between expected and achieved cost savings.
However, we also argue that this relationship is
moderated by the organizational design orienta-
tions of firms’ offshoring strategies and by firms’
offshoring experience. Firms with strategies char-
acterized by a strong orientation toward an over-
all system of structures and processes, and firms
with prior experience are more likely to anticipate
and align offshoring complexity with correspond-
ing organizational structures and processes. Thus,
organizational design orientation and experience
nurture decision makers’ abilities to anticipate the
costs of complex organizations.
Our findings contribute to the growing stream
of literature on the operational challenges of off-
shoring (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011; Stringfellow
et al., 2008) by emphasizing the importance of
hidden costs, complexity, design strategies, and
experience. On a more general level, these find-
ings have important implications for estimation
biases in strategic decision making, and improve
our understanding of the role of experience and
organizational design orientation in relation to
those biases (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and
Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993;
Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon,
1958). This research emphasizes the organizational
design of a firm and highlights how organizational
changes should be incorporated into strategic anal-
yses. This may stimulate future research on the
evolution of global firm designs and architectures
by stressing the role, magnitude, and consequences
of complexity in organizations (e.g., Ethiraj and
Levinthal, 2004; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Sinha
and Van de Ven, 2005).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
Hidden costs, complexity, and bounded
rationality
Hidden costs can be understood as implementa-
tion costs that are not anticipated in the various
stages of strategic decision making. A key function
in strategic decision making—defined as the com-
mitment to important decisions in terms of actions
to be taken, resources to be devoted, or prece-
dents set (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt
and Zbaracki, 1992; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and
The´oreˆt, 1976)—is the ability to estimate the costs
of implementing a strategic decision (Durand,
2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000). Often, how-
ever, firms find that unanticipated costs or ‘post-
decision surprises’ (Harrison and March, 1984)
erupt and challenge the strategic intent and ratio-
nale of the decision. In such cases, these costs have
been ignored or overlooked—thus hidden—by the
decision maker in the strategic decision-making
process. Hidden costs are thus ex ante unaccounted
for, which is why they materialize ex post as a
discrepancy between expected and realized costs.
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A direct consequence of hidden costs is a neg-
ative effect on a decision maker’s ability to esti-
mate the impact of strategic decisions, as important
costs are hidden from managerial attention. Previ-
ous research has emphasized that individual biases
may impact decision makers’ estimation abilities
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Das and Teng,
1999), that routines may short-circuit individuals’
autonomous judgments (Nelson and Winter, 1982),
and that dominant logic may result in blind spots
in decision making (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986).
In this paper, however, we focus on the role of
the organizational context in decision makers’ esti-
mation abilities (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and
Makridakis, 1981; March and Simon, 1958) and,
in particular, on how organizational complexity
influences decision makers’ abilities to account for
costs of implementation. Thus, we seek to under-
stand the impact of complexity on the ability of
firms to anticipate the actual costs of a strate-
gic implementation. In this regard, we are able to
explain how decision makers systematically ignore
or overlook important costs in strategic decision-
making processes.
The organizational impacts and consequences of
complexity have long been part of the research
tradition (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby,
1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Rawley, 2010;
Simon, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Simon (1962:
468) defines complexity in systems as ‘a large
number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way.’
If organizations are viewed as networks of tasks
(Grandori 2001; Thompson 1967), then complexity
exists when a large number of tasks are interdepen-
dent. For example, an organization is complex if
change in one unit requires change in many other
units. Moreover, a growing number of interdepen-
dent parts in an organization increases combina-
torial complexity, as the addition of one element
results in an exponential increase in the number of
possible interfaces and interdependencies (Ethiraj
and Levinthal, 2004).
A firm’s complexity can affect its decision mak-
ing in many ways. For example, a firm that decides
to disaggregate its organization into a number of
smaller, semiautonomous units will experience a
rise in the total number of interfaces within the
organizational system. As organizational tasks and
activities require ongoing communication to coor-
dinate decisions and behaviors, interdependencies
arise along with a growing number of channels to
coordinate joint and interdependent organizational
actions (Thompson, 1967). This has consequences
for information-processing demand (Simon, 1955),
which, in turn, increases the likelihood of decision
errors (Levinthal, 1997). As such, increasing com-
plexity progressively creates difficulties for deci-
sion makers attempting to grasp and anticipate the
effects of emerging interdependencies on system
behavior and performance (Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2004; Zhou, 2011). Complexity limits the ability
of managers to rationally account for all impor-
tant decision factors (March and Simon, 1958),
which increases the risk that certain performance-
detrimental consequences will remain hidden in the
strategic decision-making process. Hidden costs,
therefore, relate to implementation costs that are
hidden from managerial attention at the point of
strategic decision making (see Ocasio, 1997).
The hidden costs of offshoring
We investigate hidden costs in the context of ser-
vices offshoring. Offshoring refers to the inter-
nal and external sourcing of tasks and services
from a location outside the home country in sup-
port of domestic and global operations (Contrac-
tor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). Many
offshored activities are interlinked with domes-
tic processes and often require complex coordi-
nation (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). This setting
is therefore suitable for investigating the interplay
between complexity and hidden costs.
A substantial body of research has demonstrated
that offshoring decisions are driven by a number
of factors, including expectations of lower labor
and production costs (Dossani and Kenney, 2003),
access to talent and qualified labor (Lewin et al.,
2009), and opportunities to learn (Jensen, 2009).
At the same time, however, there are also indica-
tions that the initial objectives of offshoring are not
always achieved and that offshoring decisions may
eventually prove more costly than expected (Dib-
bern et al., 2008; Massini, Perm-Ajchariyawong,
and Lewin, 2010; Stringfellow et al., 2008). For
instance, the multinational information technology
(IT) corporation Dell Inc. decided to backsource
its Indian service centers after encountering unex-
pected challenges of cultural and geographic dis-
tance (Frauenheim, 2003).
The concept of hidden costs can be related to
three streams of offshoring research (see Table 1).
The first stream focuses on the impact of hidden
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 34: 533–552 (2013)
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Table 1. Three streams of research on the hidden costs of offshoring
Theoretical focus Research question Examples/consequences
of hidden costs
Indicative literature
Performance
indicator
How might the practice of offshoring
eventually undermine anticipated
financial value?
• Costs of selecting a
vendor
• Barthe´lemy (2001)
• Costs of layoffs • Overby (2003)
• Cultural costs
• Ramp-up costs
• Costs of managing an
offshore contract
Noncontractual
costs
How does international outsourcing
(in contrast to vertical integration)
create unexpected costs for firms?
• Reduce learning
capabilities
• Bettis et al. (1992)
• Reduce robustness • Hendry (1995)
• Reduce long-term
responsiveness
• Reitzig and Wagner
(2010)
• Reduce coordination
ability
• Undermine core
competences
Costs of
reconfiguration
and relocation
How does the global relocation and
reconfiguration of business tasks
and activities create unexpected
costs for firms?
• Coordination costs • Dibbern et al. (2008)
• Design/specification
costs
• Kumar et al. (2009)
• Control costs • Stringfellow et al.
(2008)
• Knowledge transfer
costs
• Srikanth and Puranam
(2011)
costs on the financial value of offshore outsourc-
ing (e.g., Barthe´lemy, 2001; Overby, 2003)—a
question of interest to business practitioners, in
particular. In emphasizing the challenges of off-
shoring, these practitioner-oriented articles have
attempted to specify and quantify the hidden finan-
cial costs of offshoring.
The second stream discusses hidden costs in
relation to strategic choices between international
outsourcing and vertical integration, where out-
sourcing—and the resulting loss of control and
transaction costs resulting from the shift of owner-
ship to an external partner—might erode firms’
capabilities and resources (e.g., Bettis, Bradley,
and Hamel, 1992; Hendry, 1995; Reitzig and
Wagner, 2010). For example, Stringfellow et al.
(2008: 166) label ‘invisible costs in offshoring
services work’ as ‘hidden communication-related
costs associated with the use of foreign service
providers.’ Reitzig and Wagner (2010) argue that
hidden outsourcing costs can disrupt incremen-
tal in-house learning processes. Dibbern et al.
(2008: 333) identify four particular types of unex-
pected ‘extra costs’ arising from outsourcing soft-
ware projects to third-party providers abroad:
‘(1) requirements specification and design, (2)
knowledge transfer, (3) control, and (4)
coordination.’
A third and more recent stream focuses more
fundamentally on hidden costs associated with
relocating and redesigning tasks and processes
within an orchestrated value-generating system;
that is, the costs of reconfiguring a firm’s internal
and external value chains (e.g., Kumar, van Fen-
ema, and von Glinow, 2009; Levy, 1995; Srikanth
and Puranam, 2011). According to this view, off-
shoring can be regarded as the process of reconfig-
uring value chain activities across dispersed loca-
tions regardless of whether outsourcing or an inter-
nal delivery model is chosen (Contractor et al.,
2010; Manning et al., 2008). Therefore, hidden
costs might arise from unanticipated organizational
needs, and can be related to areas such as knowl-
edge transfer, new interdependencies, training and
coaching, the protection of intellectual capital, or
the monitoring of performance of offshore units.
In this study, we address all three research
streams, but we focus in particular on the third
stream by examining why certain costs of reconfig-
uring a firm’s value chain in the implementation of
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both captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing
are hidden from managerial attention in decision-
making processes and thus not accounted for in
initial cost estimations. Obviously, the offshoring
of services might also encapsulate hidden bene-
fits, such as unanticipated advantages of relocat-
ing tasks and activities abroad. For instance, the
well-known ‘went for price, stayed for quality’
reference (Dossani and Kenney, 2003) captures a
situation in which firms encounter ‘positive exter-
nalities’ of offshoring. In other words, firms may
find that certain outcomes, such as higher service
quality, exceed initially expected benefits, such as
lower labor costs. However, in this paper we focus
on a setting in which the practice of offshoring
typically undermines initial objectives.
The complexity of offshoring
We propose that cost-estimation errors as a man-
ifestation of hidden costs can be explained by
increasing offshoring complexity. In contrast to a
company undertaking all of or the majority of its
activities at home in proximity to its headquar-
ters, a firm sourcing a large number of activities
from multiple internal and external providers in
different countries is likely to face higher complex-
ity. In the following, we distinguish between two
types of complexity in offshoring that challenge
decision makers’ estimation abilities: configuration
complexity and task complexity.
Configuration complexity refers to complexity
in terms of the interdependencies in the orga-
nizational configuration. In this regard, we dis-
tinguish between the structural, operational, and
social layers of the organizational configuration,
which together challenge decision makers’ cost-
estimation abilities. First, structural complexity
arises because new interdependencies emerge
between functional units and across country bor-
ders as a consequence of offshoring. For instance,
when an organizational subtask is relocated to a
foreign location, its interdependencies with other
organizational units are obscured by geographic,
political, and institutional differences
(Kumar et al., 2009). Similarly, prior research
finds that extensive outsourcing of manufactur-
ing creates new interdependencies, which increase
the likelihood of delays and disruptions in global
supply chains (e.g., Levy, 1995). Second, research
suggests that the process of offshoring presents
companies with a higher number of tasks and
activities (Contractor et al., 2010; Mudambi and
Venzin, 2010), thus increasing operational com-
plexity. Driven by the potential to lower costs and
increase efficiency by identifying specific tasks to
be offshored, firms break down and ‘fine slice’
value chain activities into a larger number of
subprocesses. For example, while research and
development (R&D) might constitute one distinct,
integrated value chain activity in a home coun-
try context, firms might choose to disaggregate
the function into a number of more narrowly
defined tasks and activities when subjecting them
to captive and outsourced offshoring. As a result,
firms face a higher number of interdependencies
among processes and, hence, increased operational
complexity.
Third, we argue that the two types of complex-
ity identified above relate to a third type, which
we call social complexity. Recent research indi-
cates that offshoring may not only provoke inter-
nal resistance (Lewin and Couto, 2007) but also
hamper operational efficiency due to a lack of
trust, status differences between onsite and off-
shore units, and a lack of understanding and com-
munication in the process of delivering tasks and
interacting with offshore units (Vlaar, van Fen-
ema, and Tiwari, 2008; Levina and Vaast, 2008).
A lack of face-to-face interaction, as well as cul-
tural and language differences among employees
at geographically dispersed locations, may increase
social complexity given the need for ‘non-simple’
practices of relationship-building between employ-
ees and teams.
Task complexity, in contrast, relates to the com-
plexity of the individual offshoring implementa-
tions (e.g., Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Kumar
et al., 2009). A number of different task character-
istics can influence the complexity of an offshoring
implementation, including the task’s degree of
standardized versus tacit knowledge flows; the
presence of inexact and unknown means-ends
connections; the number and interdependence of
subtasks; and the existence of path-goal multi-
plicity (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). In
comparison with simpler tasks for which such
aspects as input and output requirements are eas-
ily defined, complex tasks with imprecise and
ambiguous requirements are more likely to sub-
ject the decision maker to bounded rationality
and uncertainty in the decision-making process.
Indeed, research suggests that firms are increas-
ingly offshoring more complex tasks, such as
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design, engineering, and analytical services (Lewin
et al., 2009). Accordingly, we argue that the task
complexity of different offshoring implementa-
tions can challenge decision makers’ abilities to
estimate the costs of relocating a service activity
abroad.
In sum, we define offshoring complexity as a
combination of configuration and task complexity.
While task complexity resides within the actual
implementation, configuration complexity occurs
as a result of new interdependencies between coun-
tries, activities, and people. In line with research
on complexity (e.g., Anderson, 1999; Ethiraj and
Levinthal, 2004; Rawley, 2010), we argue that a
higher degree of offshoring complexity makes it
difficult for decision makers to consider all impor-
tant decision-making factors, especially the over-
arching organizational system and its effect on
organizational behavior and performance, prior to
an offshoring implementation. In particular, com-
plexity has consequences for decision makers’
cost-estimation abilities, as the managerial task of
understanding the globally reconfigured organiza-
tion becomes complicated and is more likely to be
misguided, thus resulting in costs that are hidden
from the decision makers’ view. Therefore, there
is a greater risk that decision makers facing a high
degree of offshoring complexity will make cost-
estimation errors in the decision-making process.
Accordingly:
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of offshoring
complexity is likely to increase cost-estimation
errors.
The moderating effect of organizational design
orientation and experience
A number of recent studies report that many firms
experience improved performance as a result of
offshoring, despite high complexity (e.g., Lewin
et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010). For instance,
firms taking a more strategic approach to off-
shoring, such as those adopting consistent ways
of selecting locations, implementing projects, and
coordinating operations, report better performance
(Massini et al., 2010). Thus, we posit that the
hypothesized relationship between offshoring com-
plexity and cost-estimation errors is moderated by
factors that explain why some firms are compara-
tively better than others in accounting for hidden
costs of offshoring in the strategic decision-making
process. In the following, we argue that firms’
organizational design orientation and offshoring
experience help decision makers to better estimate
costs as offshoring complexity increases.
Hidden costs become more likely as the com-
plexity of an organizational system increases. This
makes it difficult for decision makers to direct
appropriate attention during the decision-making
process to future changes in organizational struc-
tures and the interdependencies that may result
from offshoring. In this respect, the congruence
between different components in an organizational
system spread across different locations becomes
central (Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Russo and
Harrison, 2005). Organizational congruence is
defined as ‘the degree to which the needs, demands,
goals, objectives, and/or structures of one compo-
nent are consistent with those of the other’ (Nadler
and Tushman, 1997: 34). While typical models
of fit look at dyadic relationships, such as the fit
between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962),
the congruence model is based on the assump-
tion that fit can be multifaceted, simultaneously
encapsulating different organizational dimensions.
Accordingly, we use the congruence model to
portray the fit between globally dispersed orga-
nizational processes, activities, and people, that
is, the degree to which structures and interdepen-
dencies across and within organizational bound-
aries remain consistent as offshoring complexity
grows. High congruence corresponds to high con-
sistency in the organizational system encapsulating
the functional units and human resources spanning
national borders and the interdependencies among
them. Similarly, a low degree of congruence cor-
responds to low consistency in the organizational
system.
The degree to which organizational congru-
ence is reflected in a firm’s offshoring strategy is
important for how accurately decision makers esti-
mate the consequences of offshoring complexity.
A dominant perception has been that a firm’s pri-
mary objective when offshoring is to reduce labor
costs by targeting low-wage sourcing destinations,
such as China and India, and to access qualified
personnel and new markets (Dossani and Kenney,
2003; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007). However, research
suggests that offshoring may also be motivated by
the opportunity to improve a firm’s organizational
system (Lewin and Couto, 2007). For example, a
number of firms view the potential for increased
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organizational flexibility, business process reengi-
neering, and reduced system redundancy as an
important driver of offshoring. Moreover, firms
with corporate-wide offshoring strategies report
a range of offshoring outcomes besides reduced
costs, such as organizational flexibility (Massini
et al., 2010).
We therefore argue that offshoring strategies
involving a strong orientation toward the overall
system of structures and processes, rather than the
mere relocation of particular tasks for resource-
seeking reasons, are better able to account for
the hidden costs that follow from increasing off-
shoring complexity, as managerial attention is
directed toward how the organization and its inter-
dependencies are affected by the offshoring deci-
sion (Ocasio, 1997). In such situations, decision
makers can match the impact of the anticipated
organizational changes caused by offshoring with
resource allocations so that the main offshoring
objectives can be met. Thus, a higher degree of
orientation toward the organizational design of off-
shoring promotes the decision maker’s ability to
align offshoring complexity with corresponding
organizational structures and processes, and con-
sequently negatively moderates the positive rela-
tionship between complexity and cost-estimation
errors. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: The positive association between
offshoring complexity and cost-estimation errors
is negatively moderated by firms’ strategic ori-
entation toward organizational design.
A necessary prerequisite for recognizing the
most efficient mechanisms for managing com-
plex organizations is extensive organizational sys-
tem knowledge. Organizational system knowledge
can be defined as knowledge about individual
organizational activities comprising an organiza-
tional system and about how those activities are
integrated into an orchestrated organizational sys-
tem (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and
Clark, 1990). In order to make effective decisions
based on expectations of how the organization is
going to change, decision makers need knowl-
edge about individual activities and about the ways
in which different activities are integrated and
linked together in a coherent organizational sys-
tem. For example, Brusoni and Prencipe (2006)
argue that knowledge evolution is a strong and
important mediator in organizational change. Sim-
ilarly, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) suggest that
complex and heterogeneous circumstances spur
positive learning in organizations. Accordingly,
firms’ abilities to estimate the consequences of the
complexity of offshoring are affected by their orga-
nizational system knowledge, including knowledge
of interdependencies and interfaces between differ-
ent units and activities.
Thus, a central question is the following: how
do firms acquire and accumulate knowledge to
successfully integrate a vast array of heteroge-
neous activities into an orchestrated system? In
this respect, offshoring is often portrayed as a
learning-by-doing process (Jensen, 2009; Maskell
et al., 2007). In particular, research shows that
firms with previous offshoring experience gen-
erally display better performance in new off-
shoring ventures (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, and
Volberba, 2007; Manning et al., 2008). Hutzschen-
reuter et al. (2007) argue that firms’ past offshoring
experience may influence the range of issues and
possibilities that managers consider when making
offshoring decisions. Thus, we argue that firms
with prior offshoring experience are more likely
to have accumulated organizational system knowl-
edge and will therefore be comparatively better in
estimating the costs of offshoring associated with
complexity. In other words, firms with experience
are more likely to anticipate the hidden costs of
offshoring and therefore avoid estimation errors.
We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: The positive association between
offshoring complexity and cost-estimation errors
is negatively moderated by the firms’ offshoring
experience.
In sum, we derive a theoretical model of hidden
costs in which offshoring complexity is likely to
increase cost-estimation errors but is negatively
moderated by organizational design orientation and
experience (see Figure 1).
DATA AND METHODS
We examine both the effect of offshoring complex-
ity on cost-estimation errors as a manifestation of
hidden costs, and the moderating effects of design
orientation and offshoring experience of the firm
using primary data collected by the Offshoring
Copyright  2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 34: 533–552 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
540 M.M. Larsen, S. Manning, and T. Pedersen
Organizational
design orientation
H1 +
H3 -
Offshoring
complexity
Cost-
estimation
errors
Offshoring
experience
H2 -
Figure 1. Theoretical model: the hidden costs of
offshoring
Research Network (ORN) and data gathered from
secondary sources (on distances). The ORN is a
network of scholars and organizations based in the
United States, Europe, and Australia that study the
emergence of trends in services offshoring (e.g.,
Lewin et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010; Manning,
Lewin, and Schuerch, 2011). Since its founda-
tion in 2004, the ORN research team has con-
ducted two major surveys annually—a corporate
client survey and a service provider survey—to
collect offshoring-related data. As both the client
and provider surveys are taken online, respondents
reach the survey Web site through external links or
e-mail invitations. Once registered and approved
by the ORN survey team, respondents are added
to the database. The fact that both surveys are
utilized for this study, in combination with other
secondary sources, helps us address the common
method variance problem (Chang, van Witteloost-
uijn, and Eden, 2010).
The corporate client survey collects data from
U.S. firms (since 2004) and European firms (since
2006) on their offshoring strategies, drivers, con-
cerns, risks, outcomes, future plans, and con-
crete offshore implementations, including infor-
mation on tasks offshored, launch years, location
choices, delivery models (both captive and out-
sourced), and performance data. The dataset used
for this study includes data from 183 firms, of
which 102 are based in the United States and
81 are European. These firms are active in dif-
ferent industries: manufacturing (32%), software
(18%), finance and insurance (18%), and tech-
nical services (14%). Thirty-five percent of the
firms are large (>10, 000 employees), 47 percent
are medium size (500–10,000 employees), and 18
percent are small (<500 employees). These firms
reported 531 offshore implementations, defined as
the allocation of particular tasks or processes to
a location outside the home country. This implies
that each firm has provided data for an average of
3.2 offshore implementations. Offshored tasks may
include IT services, administrative services (e.g.,
Human Resources, legal, finance, and accounting),
call centers, software and product development,
marketing and sales, and procurement. The three
most common services offshored in our sample
are IT services (22%), call centers (17%), and
engineering services (10%). Offshoring implemen-
tations include captive offshoring projects (48%)
as well as offshore outsourcing projects (52%).
The statistical analysis is conducted on the level
of (these 531) offshore implementations.
In addition, we use data from the ORN ser-
vice provider survey. The service provider survey
has collected information from business service
providers at the firm and services level since 2007.
Survey participants provide information on the ser-
vices they provide; the locations from which they
provide those services; perceived client expecta-
tions and operational risks; the performance of
service delivery; and various features of the ser-
vices provided. The latter include such items
as the degree of commoditization and the com-
plexity of tasks. The service provider database
contains data (as of 2011) from 755 providers
based in different countries and regions, includ-
ing the United States (32%), India (18%), China
(4%), other Asian countries (8%), Western Europe
(19%), Eastern Europe (7%), and Latin America
(6%). The database contains data from all major
large providers (19% of the sample had more than
10,000 employees), including Infosys, Genpact,
IBM Global Services, and Wipro. It also cov-
ers mid-size providers (37%; 500–10,000 employ-
ees) and small providers (44%; <500 employ-
ees). Providers in the database offer various ser-
vices, such as IT services (74% of providers),
software development (65%), call centers (48%),
finance and accounting (41%), HR services (30%),
engineering services (29%), marketing and sales
(26%), procurement (25%), R&D (25%), design
(19%), and legal (13%). Altogether, the database
contains 3,399 service-specific entries, that is,
observations related to particular services that
providers offer.
For the analysis, we use a hierarchical regression
analysis with successive linear regression models,
adding more explanatory variables to each model.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) models are most
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suitable for this analysis, as we have a depen-
dent variable with continuous values and as we
propose a linear relationship between our depen-
dent variable and the explanatory variables. The
hierarchical feature refers to the gradual building
of separate but related models with an increasing
number of explanatory variables until we reach the
final model. We use three different versions of the
final model in which all explanatory variables are
included. First, we include all implementations in
our sample (N = 531) to investigate the hypothe-
ses. This model contains both captive and out-
sourced implementations. However, because there
are transactional differences between captive off-
shoring and offshore outsourcing (see Williamson,
1985), we also split the sample into captive imple-
mentations (N = 253) and outsourced implemen-
tations (N = 278), and run the full model for both
samples.
Variable construction
The variables, their sources, and their operational-
ization are presented in Table 2. Cost-estimation
error is measured as the difference between the
cost savings expected from the offshoring project
and the achieved cost savings. Most firms off-
shore with the objective of reducing costs (Man-
ning et al., 2008). Thus, a strong empirical proxy
of latent hidden costs is the deviation between
expected and realized cost savings in offshoring. If
expectations perfectly match the savings achieved
through offshoring, then there has been no esti-
mation error, but if expectations exceed achieved
savings, then expectations have not been met and
estimation error has occurred (costs are higher
than expected). The few cases in which achieved
savings are above expectations (‘hidden benefits’)
are deleted from the sample, as this phenomenon
might be explained by factors other than hidden
costs. Both expected savings and achieved savings
are measured as a share of total costs, so the value
of cost-estimation error can vary from zero percent
(when achieved savings are equal to expectations)
to 100 percent (when expected savings are very
high but no savings are actually achieved).
Offshoring complexity is measured along two
dimensions: configuration complexity and task
complexity. Configuration complexity is a compos-
ite measure consisting of three dimensions with the
purpose of capturing structural, operational, and
social complexity, respectively: global diversity of
offshore operations (i.e., the number of countries
in which a firm is conducting offshoring), disag-
gregation of activities (the number of services for
which a firm engages in offshoring), and spread
of employees (the number of persons employed
in offshore projects). After each of these dimen-
sions is measured, they are then standardized and
mean-centered around zero. The measure of con-
figuration complexity is constructed as the prod-
uct of these dimensions, which all have an equal
weight in the composite measure. This measure
is inspired by previous studies measuring organi-
zational complexity as the degree of firms’ func-
tional and occupational differentiation (e.g., Aiken,
Bacharach, and French, 1980; Blau and McKin-
ley, 1979; Damanpour, 1996). Task complexity is
measured as the degree to which service providers
view a particular task or process as complex. Data
on this item is collected in the service provider
survey by asking service providers to rank the
complexity of different types of tasks on a five-
point Likert scale (1 = not complex at all; 5 =
very complex). The relatively low correlation of
−0.06 (see Table 3) between configuration com-
plexity and task complexity indicates that these are
two distinct dimensions of offshoring complexity.
Offshoring experience is a simple measure made
for each implementation. It is measured as the
time (in years) between the launch of the first off-
shoring project by the focal firm and the initiation
of the focal implementation. The assumption is that
the longer the respective firm has been engaged
in offshoring projects, the more experience it has
accumulated. There may be other ways to mea-
sure experience, perhaps by taking the number of
services offshored or the number of locations off-
shored to into account. However, as we distinguish
between experience and offshoring complexity, we
focus on years of experience. Importantly, some
firms offshore a variety of services to different
locations in a short period of time, so that they
have little saturated experience. Other firms might
focus on offshoring particular functions over a
longer period of time. The approach adopted here
is akin to that used in other papers (e.g., Lewin
et al., 2009).
Organizational design orientation is measured
by asking respondents to indicate the extent to
which ‘business process redesign’ is a driver for
offshoring particular services on a five-point Likert
scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = very impor-
tant). The measure captures the extent to which
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Table 2. Operationalization of variables in the models
Variable Operationalization Data Source
Cost-estimation error Percentage of savings expected minus the percentage of savings
achieved when offshoring
ORN Client survey
Configuration
complexity
The product of the number of services, number of countries, and
number of employees (in thousands) that are offshored
ORN Client survey
Task complexity The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the complexity of tasks’ (on a five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Offshoring experience Years from the launch of the firm’s first offshoring project to the
focal implementation
ORN Client survey
Organizational design
orientation
Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of
enhancing efficiency through business process redesign as a
strategic driver for the offshore implementations (1 = not
important at all; 5 = very important)
ORN Client survey
Cost orientation Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of labor
cost savings as a strategic driver for the offshore
implementations (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)
ORN Client survey
Interaction with client The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the frequency of client interaction’ (on a
five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Interdependency of
client
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the interdependency with processes in client
organization’ (on a five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Disagreement with
client
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the frequency of disagreement with client in
performing tasks’ (on a five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Commoditization The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the extent of commoditization today’ (on a
five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Use of collaborative
technologies
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s
assessment of ‘the collaborative technologies used in
performing tasks’ (on a five-point scale).
ORN Provider survey
Geographical distance The distance in air miles (in thousands km) between the home
location and the offshore location
Google distance
calculator
Cultural distance The Kogut-Singh index of distance between the home location
and the offshore location
Hofstede’s measures
Language distance A dummy indicating whether the main language spoken in the
home location is the same as the language spoken in the
offshore location (1 = different)
MLA language map
Home employment Number of employees in home country in thousands ORN Client survey
IT service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an IT service
(1 = IT service)
ORN Client survey
Call center service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is a call center
service (1 = call center service)
ORN Client survey
Engineering service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an
engineering service (1 = engineering service)
ORN Client survey
Outsourcing A dummy indicating whether the offshore implementation is
captive offshoring (= 0) or offshore outsourcing (= 1)
ORN Client survey
Time Months since the respective offshoring project was implemented ORN Client survey
offshoring projects that are related to particular
services have been implemented in conjunction
with optimizing the entire work process. In other
words, we use this item as a proxy for the level
of managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) given to
the orchestration of globally distributed processes.
The correlation of −0.21 (p < 0.001) between
the ‘business process redesign’ and ‘labor cost
savings’ drivers indicates that the business process
redesign driver is clearly distinct from the cost
driver. The latter primarily captures managerial
attention given to the cost benefits of offshoring
particular processes without necessarily consider-
ing the impact of any one project on the entire
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workflow. Therefore, the attention respondents pay
to business process redesign when offshoring is
viewed as a good proxy for whether they consider
the organizational design in the offshoring process.
In addition, a number of control variables are
included. First, we control for cost orientation
(in contrast to organizational design orientation)
by including an item on ‘labor cost savings’ as
a driver of offshoring implementation. We also
include a number of variables from the ORN Ser-
vice Provider Survey in order to control for differ-
ent factors at the service level. We control for three
transaction-related effects for each offshored ser-
vice: the frequency of interactions with the client
(as a proxy for frequency), interdependence of
client activities (as proxy for asset specificity), and
frequency of disagreements with the client (as a
proxy for uncertainty) (Williamson, 1985). These
are ranked on a five-point Likert scale by the ser-
vice providers for each service in which they are
engaged. We also include commoditization of tasks,
which refers to the process by which processes
become less specific to firm or product characteris-
tics, thereby lowering transaction and coordination
costs for those firms offshoring those processes
(Davenport, 2005). Moreover, the use of collabo-
rative technologies in the service is added to con-
trol for the use of information and communication
technology in the firm. The abovementioned ORN
Service Provider Survey control variables are mea-
sured using service-specific variables based on the
perception of service providers, which are ranked
using five-point Likert scales.
To capture other potential sources of hidden
costs (e.g., Stringfellow et al., 2008), we add con-
trol variables for interaction distance. These are
measured using secondary data on the distance
between the home location and the foreign loca-
tion of the offshore implementation. Interaction
distance includes three dimensions: geographical
distance, measured as air miles between the home
location and the offshore location; cultural dis-
tance between two locations based on the Kogut
and Singh index (Kogut and Singh, 1988); and
language distance as a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the same language is spoken both in
the home and offshore locations.
Controls are also included for the three most
common services—IT, call center, and engineer-
ing —as the level of hidden costs might be affected
by characteristics of particular services. As can be
seen in the correlation matrix (Table 3), the nature
of these services is rather distinct in terms of such
factors as task complexity. For example, call center
services are negatively correlated, engineering ser-
vices are positively correlated, and IT services are
between these extremes. The services are added as
dummy variables.
Along similar lines, we include the number of
employees in the home country to control for firm
size. We also control for the type of delivery model
by using a dummy for captive offshoring ver-
sus offshore outsourcing. Finally, we control for
the time passed (in months) since the project was
implemented. As it can be more difficult to retro-
spectively assess discrepancies between expected
and realized costs the older a project is, this control
variable captures biases related to the perceptions
of the respondents.
The correlation matrix and descriptive data
(mean values, standard deviation, and minimum
and maximum values) are provided in Table 3. In
order to detect potential problems of multicolinear-
ity, we look at the correlation coefficients among
the independent variables in the models. None of
the correlations are above the usual threshold of
0.4 that indicates a possibility of multicolinearity.
Hence, the dataset does not seem to suffer from
problems of multicolinearity. However, as the task
complexity variable is relatively highly correlated
with some of the control variables measured at the
services level, we ran the models without these
variables. All results were qualitatively the same.
The mean value of our dependent variable—
cost-estimation errors—is 6.68, indicating that,
on average, firms achieved 6.7 percent less sav-
ings on their offshoring implementations than they
expected. The standard deviation of 10.11 signi-
fies that the observed firms vary in terms of their
estimation accuracy, as actually achieved savings
span from 25 percent to 100 percent of expected
savings. However, a closer look at the frequency
of the cost-estimation error variable shows that 52
percent of the implementations (N = 278) show no
cost-estimation errors at all (savings meet expec-
tations), while 48 percent reveal different levels of
cost-estimation errors (higher costs than expected).
In 27 percent of cases, achieved cost savings are
lower than expected, but not by more than 10 per-
cent, while in approximately 21 percent of cases
achieved savings are more than 10 percent lower
than expected. These figures show that there is
good variation in the dependent variable across
the included firms and also provides evidence that
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cost-estimation errors are a significant problem
facing many offshoring firms.
Moreover, if we divide the sample into captive
offshoring and offshore outsourcing, our results
show that relatively high cost-estimation error is
more common in cases of offshore outsourcing
than in cases of captive offshoring. The average
levels of cost-estimation error are 7.92 for off-
shore outsourcing and 5.32 for captive offshoring
(which is a significant difference in an analysis
of variance, p < 0.01). Furthermore, 26 percent
of all offshore outsourcing cases report that costs
were more than 10 percent higher than expected,
while this is true for only 16 percent of the captive
offshoring cases. When expected and achieved sav-
ings are examined separately, we find that the dif-
ference in cost-estimation error is due to expected
savings being significantly higher for offshore out-
sourcing, while the achieved savings are at the
same level for captive and outsource offshoring.
We explore this difference later in the paper.
RESULTS
The results of the hierarchical regression model are
presented in Table 4. Model 1 includes the control
variables and the two explanatory variables reflect-
ing offshoring complexity: configuration complex-
ity and task complexity. We add the two moder-
ating variables—organizational design orientation
and offshoring experience—in Model 2. In Model
3, we add the interaction effect between the two
complexity variables and our two moderating vari-
ables.
In all three models, the two complexity variables
are significant (p < 0.05) and positive, which sup-
ports the hypothesis that offshoring complexity
is an important determinant of cost-estimation
error as manifested in hidden costs of offshoring
(Hypothesis 1). Model 1, which includes the two
complexity variables, obtains an R2 value of 0.11.
When the two moderating variables are added in
Model 2, the R2 only increases to 0.12, which is
due to the fact that none of the moderating vari-
ables are significant in this model. In Model 3, we
go one step further and include the four interaction
terms in order to test for the proposed moderat-
ing effects (Hypotheses 2 and 3). However, the
model does not improve, as the R2 only increases
to 0.13 with the use of four additional degrees
of freedom. Moreover, only the interaction terms
between task complexity and organizational design
orientation are negative and significant as expected
(β = −1.78, p < 0.05).
Notably, some of the control variables are signif-
icantly related to cost-estimation error. Those fac-
tors increasing cost-estimation errors include cost
orientation, task interdependence with client activ-
ities, cultural distance, language distance, and call
center services, while commoditization and time
passed since the initiation of the offshoring project
lower cost-estimation errors. These results support
complementary explanations for cost-estimation
error and hidden costs, as they highlight transac-
tional factors, such as task interdependency with
client operations and interaction distance like cul-
tural and language distance (see Stringfellow et al.,
2008). In addition, the outsourcing variable is sig-
nificant in Model 1 (β = 1.78, p < 0.05), which
reflects the higher level of cost-estimation error
for offshore outsourcing as compared to captive
offshoring.
In order to go beyond just adding the out-
sourcing variable as a control variable, the full
model is applied to the two samples of captive
offshoring and offshore outsourcing in Models 4
and 5, respectively. Interestingly, the R2 increases
substantially in both cases, reaching 0.34 in the
case of captive offshoring and 0.20 for offshore
outsourcing. However, it is also obvious that the
variables have different effects in the subsamples.
In fact, no variable is significant in both sub-
samples. In the case of captive offshoring, con-
figuration complexity significantly increases cost-
estimation errors (β = 2.14, p < 0.001), while
task complexity is insignificant. Both interaction
terms—configuration complexity in terms of orga-
nizational design orientation and offshoring expe-
rience—are significant and negative (β = −0.29,
p < 0.01 and β = −0.06, p < 0.05, respectively),
while neither organizational design orientation nor
offshoring experience by themselves have signifi-
cant effects. These results are in line with Hypothe-
ses 2 and 3, which propose that organizational
design orientation and offshoring experience neg-
atively moderate the positive relationship between
complexity and hidden costs. Of the control vari-
ables, the most notable are the significant positive
distance variables (geographical and language dis-
tance), which indicate that cost-estimation errors
increase as the distance between the home location
and the offshore location increases.
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression models (N = 531)—standard errors in parenthesis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Cost-estimation error in decision making
All implementations Captive offshoring Offshore outsourcing
Configuration complexity 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.40∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.47) (0.63)
Task complexity 6.71∗ 6.41∗ 12.59∗∗ 7.46 23.09∗∗∗
(2.73) (1.86) (3.86) (5.02) (5.53)
Org. design orientation −0.13 −0.67∗ −1.64 −1.09∗
(0.35) (0.28) (1.85) (0.41)
Offshoring experience −0.04 −0.48 −0.12 −0.14
(0.06) (0.46) (0.08) (0.09)
Configuration complexity∗ −0.04 −0.29∗∗ −0.02
Org. design orientation (0.09) (0.11) (0.17)
Configuration complexity∗ −0.04 −0.06∗ −0.03
Offshoring experience (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
Task complexity∗ −1.78∗ 0.60 −2.80∗
Org. design orientation (0.78) (1.04) (1.11)
Task complexity∗ Offshoring 0.13 0.01 −0.45†
experience (0.14) (0.14) (0.26)
Costs orientation 1.07∗ 0.98∗ 1.04∗ −0.46 2.25∗
(0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.55) (0.87)
Commoditization −15.21∗∗∗ −15.01∗∗∗ −15.65∗∗∗ −4.37 −23.99∗∗∗
(4.25) (4.29) (4.28) (5.46) (6.12)
Use of collaborative −1.77 −1.85 −1.61 −3.22 7.14
technologies (4.77) (4.78) (4.79) (6.71) (6.79)
Interaction with client 9.31 8.88 9.13 2.03 19.83∗
(5.98) (6.03) (6.03) (7.55) (8.99)
Interdependency of client 12.94∗∗ 12.91∗∗ 13.31∗∗ 2.60 25.16∗∗
(4.62) (4.64) (4.63) (5.73) (7.61)
Disagreement with client 7.49 7.41 8.46 0.19 6.38
(4.61) (4.61) (4.67) (6.04) (7.91)
Geographical distance 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.39∗ 0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21)
Cultural distance 0.23∗ 0.23∗ 0.24∗ 0.15 0.36∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16)
Language distance 2.83∗ 2.93 2.91∗ 3.89∗ 1.35
(1.28) (1.29)∗ (1.28) (1.59) (1.86)
Call center service 16.45∗∗ 16.20∗∗ 18.02∗∗∗ 0.95 25.22∗∗
(5.08) (5.11) (5.19) (6.81) (8.10)
IT service 2.49 2.45 2.73 3.78† 2.42
(1.72) (1.72) (1.73) (2.11) (2.88)
Engineering service −2.68 −2.51 −2.42 −1.88 −2.59
(2.01) (2.03) (2.03) (2.36) (3.31)
Home employment −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time −0.39∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.29
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19)
Outsourcing 1.78∗ 1.75† 1.47
(0.90) (0.90) (0.90)
Intercept 55.20∗∗∗ 45.01∗∗ 35.32∗ 27.42 83.97†
(14.43) (18.00) (19.14) (16.67) (44.62)
N 531 531 531 253 278
F-value 4.07∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗
R-square 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.34 0.20
† , ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively. The significant hypothesized relationships are
in bold.
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In the case of offshore outsourcing implemen-
tations, task complexity is significant and posi-
tive (β = 23.09, p < 0.001), while configuration
complexity is insignificant. The two interaction
terms with task complexity are also significantly
negative, although the interaction term between
task complexity and offshoring experience is only
moderately significant (β = −0.45, p < 0.1). This
provides further support for Hypotheses 2 and 3,
indicating that organizational design orientation
and experience mitigate cost-estimation errors in
the case of offshore outsourcing as well. Of the
control variables, it is evident that the more task-
oriented variables (such as commoditization) and
transaction-oriented variables (such as interaction
with client and interdependency with client opera-
tions) are significant in predicting cost-estimation
errors in outsourcing implementations.
In order to test the robustness of our find-
ings, we conduct a number of alternative spec-
ifications of our models. These alternative spec-
ifications included Tobit models (as we have a
skewed dependent variable), logistic models (a
binary dependent model with or without hidden
costs), and random coefficients models (controlling
for firm effects). All of these models provide qual-
itatively similar, but weaker, results than the one
reported here. In addition, we believe that from a
theoretical point of view we have applied the most
appropriate model in order to test the hypothe-
ses, as our dependent variable is measured on a
continuous scale, and as the question of whether
hidden costs and cost-estimation error exist can-
not be separated from the level of hidden costs.
Both aspects are determined simultaneously in our
preferred model.
Furthermore, we have addressed the issue of
endogeneity, that is, whether the complexity vari-
ables are endogenously determined by the same
factors as the estimation errors, because those man-
agers who underestimate costs might also offshore
more and thereby increase the complexity. We did
so by running simultaneous equation models with
instrumental variables. For this purpose, we used
a set of instruments that is correlated with the
endogenous variable (complexity, in our case) but
not correlated with the error from the regression
in which the endogenous regressor appears (Stock,
Wright, and Yogo, 2002). From a theoretical per-
spective, it seems likely that the ‘objective’ instru-
ments in our model—geographical distance, home
employment, and call center service, which are
all correlated with the complexity variables (see
Table 3)—would pass this test. In addition, from
an empirical perspective, there seems to be lim-
ited evidence of endogeneity problems as all of the
results remain qualitatively the same in the simul-
taneous equation models with instrument variables.
Accordingly, the Hausman test favors the use of
OLS models, which is also hinted at by the low
correlations (0.09–0.11) between the complexity
variables and cost-estimation errors (see Table 3).
In addition, to test for overidentifying restrictions,
we regressed the residual from the cost-estimation
error equation on the instruments for the model
(Sargan, 1958). The R2 value in this regression
is very low (0.0084) and none of the predictors
are statistically significant. We also inspected the
bivariate correlations between the instruments and
the residuals, all of which were insignificant and
close to zero. In combination, these tests do not
provide absolute proof of the absence of endo-
geneity (see, e.g., Hahn, Ham, and Moon, 2011),
but they do suggest that the problem has been
addressed in our model.
DISCUSSION
Firms and their managers often find that the initial
objectives of strategic decisions are substantially
undermined by hidden costs of implementation
(e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Reitzig and Wagner,
2010; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In this paper, we
have argued that hidden costs—implementation
costs that are neglected in strategic decision mak-
ing—occur in situations of complexity in which
decision makers are likely to be subject to bounded
rationality. Faced with high complexity, decision
makers are more likely to ignore the consequences
of implementation and organizational change, and
therefore fail to estimate the actual costs of a strate-
gic decision. Hence, estimation errors are the man-
ifestation of underlying and latent hidden costs.
We have studied the phenomenon of such esti-
mation errors in the context of the offshoring of
administrative and technical services. Firms off-
shore service activities for a number of reasons: to
reduce costs, to acquire strategic resources, and to
gain market proximity (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009).
Accordingly, we have argued that hidden costs
occur in offshoring when the relocation of service
activities abroad entails implementation costs that
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are initially ignored or unanticipated by decision
makers.
Based on comprehensive data from the ORN,
we have developed a model of hidden costs
that highlights the roles of offshoring complexity
(task and configuration complexity), organizational
design orientation, and experience in explaining
why decision makers systematically fail to esti-
mate the actual costs of services offshoring. In
general, we find empirical support for our model:
offshoring complexity increases cost-estimation
errors (Hypothesis 1), whereas design orientation
(Hypothesis 2) and experience (Hypothesis 3) neg-
atively moderate this relationship. However, while
captive offshoring is much more responsive to
broader configuration and design factors, hidden
costs in offshore outsourcing are more driven by
task- and transaction-related factors.
Our findings correspond to recent research sug-
gesting that firms with a strategic, rather than
opportunistic, approach to offshoring decisions are
not only likely to generate higher savings but
are also more accurate in their savings expecta-
tions (e.g., Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al.,
2010). However, rather than looking at strategies
in general, we focus on indicators of a firm’s ori-
entation toward improving and orchestrating orga-
nizational processes and structures through and
alongside offshoring. Interestingly, a design orien-
tation does not seem to reduce hidden costs per se;
only when the complexity of offshore operations
increases does a strong orientation toward orches-
trating different structures and processes reduce
hidden costs. This can be partly explained by the
fact that as firms increase the scale and scope of
offshoring, they may reach a tipping point where
existing processes and structures conflict with the
new setup of the globally dispersed operations
(Massini et al., 2010). At this point, only those
firms actively seeking to reorganize their structures
and processes in a coherent way may benefit from
an increased scale and scope of offshoring. While
this clearly hints at the transformational potential
of offshoring, it also points to the need for firms
to actively manage this potential, and to match the
increasing relocation of processes with the adap-
tation of organizational structures and capabilities
(Manning et al., 2008).
In addition, we find that cost-estimation errors
due to hidden costs are significantly higher in off-
shore outsourcing implementations than in captive
offshore implementations. Our results also indicate
that in the case of captive (internal) offshoring, hid-
den costs increase with configuration complexity,
whereas hidden costs result from increased task-
level complexity in the case of offshore outsourc-
ing. This highlights that task- and relationship-
specific uncertainty, along with transaction costs,
strongly affect overall operational costs in the case
of outsourcing. In this regard, several studies show
how certain design capabilities and mechanisms at
the task level, such as contract design (Argyres
and Mayer, 2007) and the alignment of client
and vendor operations (Manning et al., 2011), can
help firms better anticipate and manage operational
costs outside their immediate control. Similarly,
outsourcing typically involves tasks that are more
standardized than those in captive offshoring (as
indicated by the significant positive correlation of
0.14 between task commoditization and outsourc-
ing in Table 3). In contrast, captive offshoring is
more exposed to configuration complexity issues,
which increase the role of organizational design,
as the decision maker has more discretion to make
changes in the organization of internal activities. In
comparison, task complexity in the case of captive
operations does not significantly increase hidden
costs, which indicates a greater internal capacity to
manage (and plan for) complex tasks. Importantly,
however, as offshoring complexity grows beyond
certain tasks, hidden costs become an issue in cap-
tive operations, a finding that points to the roles of
design and experience in safeguarding operations
as offshoring increases in scale and scope.
The present study has important implications for
ongoing research on hidden costs of globally dis-
persed and complex operations. The concept of
hidden costs in the offshoring literature is new and
has so far only been used conceptually to under-
score how the relocation of activities abroad might
be more challenging than initially expected (e.g.,
Dibbern et al., 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). We
contribute to this research by uncovering drivers
of estimation errors and the potential to foresee
hidden costs when integrating globally dispersed
and disaggregated operations into an orchestrated
organization (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and
Puranam, 2011).
On a more general level, this study helps us bet-
ter understand estimation biases in strategic deci-
sion making, and the effects of experience and
organizational design orientation on those biases
(e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis,
1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Makadok and
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Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). A firm’s
estimation ability captures how accurately it can
estimate and forecast the outcomes of organiza-
tional changes resulting from the implementation
of a strategic decision (Kahneman and Tversky,
1984). However, while the inhibiting role of com-
plexity in decision-making processes is well estab-
lished (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby,
1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002), we have
shown that this relationship is negatively moder-
ated by the organizational design orientation of the
decision maker (Ocasio, 1997). As the implemen-
tation of a strategic decision, such as the relo-
cation of activities abroad, entails organizational
changes, the decision maker must direct attention
to how these changes might affect such aspects as
the coordination of joint and interdependent orga-
nizational action (Thompson, 1967), information
processing demand (Simon, 1955), and organiza-
tional response capacity (Anderson, 1999).
Moreover, we have argued that the accumula-
tion of organizational system knowledge (Brusoni
and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990)
is necessary for the decision maker to make effec-
tive strategic decisions in a context of complex-
ity. Decision makers need experience and knowl-
edge about the aspects of organizational design
that deserve their attention. Thus, in viewing a
firm’s estimation ability as a distinctive organi-
zational competence (Durand, 2003; Hogarth and
Makridakis, 1981; Makadok and Walker, 2000),
this study implies that the fit between complexity
and organizational design plays a key role in the
implementation of strategies and should therefore
be incorporated in strategic analyses.
Our findings also add to research on appropriate
organizational designs in complex environments
(Ethiraj and Levintal, 2004; Nadler and Tushman,
1997) by stressing that the recent offshoring trend
challenges the capacity of conventional organiza-
tional forms and structures to facilitate and safe-
guard globally dispersed operations (Srikanth and
Puranam, 2011). Future research should aim to bet-
ter understand the effects of different design alter-
natives and mechanisms that firms utilize when
they reach a certain level of complexity. A related
issue is the extent to which design elements can
be ‘firm specific’—reflecting more or less spe-
cific locations and processes across countries and
locations.
In addition, we emphasize the role of expe-
rience in strengthening the moderating effect of
complexity on hidden costs. In this regard, we sup-
port research that underscores the central role of
knowledge evolution in organizational change and
design (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson
and Clark, 1990). We can assume that different
forms of experience and learning might contribute
differently to organizational behavior and perfor-
mance (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Madsen
and Desai, 2010). Future research could therefore
investigate which types of experience and learn-
ing contribute the most to the identification of
organizational forms and structures in increasingly
complex firms.
Limitations and future research
Our study has some limitations that should be
addressed in future research. First, the concept
of hidden costs is difficult to measure. We oper-
ationalized it as the respondents’ perceptions of
the difference between the expected and realized
savings of offshoring, using cross-sectional obser-
vations. However, this operationalization might be
skewed (Golden, 1992), especially as we ask for
retrospective views about initial expectations. As
a result, hidden costs might be underestimated in
our study (although our results still hold despite the
possible conservative bias of the dependent vari-
able). A research design using observations col-
lected before and after the offshoring implementa-
tion would have obvious advantages compared to
the design used in this study. Also, as we primarily
relied on survey data, we were unable to analyze
the actual decision-making process and we did not
look at specific implementation processes in detail.
Future studies can use qualitative research designs
to better address the various factors contributing to
the ignorance of implementation costs in decision-
making processes under conditions of complexity.
We have also limited the theoretical explanation
of our dependent variable to the role of the organi-
zational context in the decision maker’s estimation
ability, thus leaving out an important discussion on
intentionality (Hutzschenreuter et al. 2007; Salas,
Rosen, and DiazGranados, 2010). For instance, sit-
uations of complexity may entail increased uncer-
tainty, which invites political processes in deci-
sion making. In such situations, stakeholders may
seek influence by emphasizing arguments that
serve their own interests while downplaying others
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(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Decision mak-
ers may also follow institutional norms, bureau-
cratic procedures, and prior strategic commitments
to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983), thereby allowing for solu-
tions that might be inefficient. Thus, while we
assume that the organizational environment has a
significant influence on decision-making processes
in which some cost factors are unintentionally
ignored, other cost factors may be intentionally
downplayed in order to promote particular deci-
sions. In this sense, a strong orientation toward
organizational design could be a way to address
politics within the organization. Future research
could therefore investigate the ramifications of
intentional underestimations of costs in complex
organizations. For instance, is there evidence that
decision makers intentionally underestimate the
costs of implementing strategic decisions? How
might variables such as complexity, organizational
design orientation, and experience affect decision
makers in terms of intentionally underestimating
future costs?
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, by explaining deviations between
strategic objectives and actual performance through
the concept of hidden costs, an important field
of research is unlocked that can more accurately
clarify unintended consequences of firms’ strategic
behavior. While we found that complexity, along
with experience and orientation toward organiza-
tional design, explained much of this deviation, a
number of other contingencies should be examined
in future research. In this regard, our study sug-
gests that drivers of hidden costs within the bound-
ary of the firm may differ from hidden costs in the
context of interorganizational arrangements. This
difference deserves further exploration. Finally,
our study highlights services offshoring as an
increasingly important empirical field for investi-
gating strategic decision making, complexity, and
design in contemporary organizations.
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